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EXPLAINING AFRICAN PARTICIPATION 
IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
PETER BRETT AND LINE ENGBO GISSEL* 
Africa has more international courts than any other continent. Yet international relations scholarship has failed 
to explain this African move to law. This article does so using Bayart’s concept of extraversion. It shows how 
the creation of international courts in the 1990s and early 2000s was the result of extraverted strategies for 
attracting international resources and pre-empting donor pressures for political and legal reforms. By adopting 
these strategies, African states failed to behave in the ‘strategic’ manner anticipated by both constructivist and 
liberal institutionalist international relations theory. International court creation did not reflect the pursuit of 
national interests or a response to normative NGO pressures. Making this argument, the article analyses the 
design and ratification of two new international courts: the SADC Tribunal and International Criminal Court. 
Using the case studies of Zimbabwe and Kenya, it shows how global scripts were repeated by even those states 
which have, in recent years, most vocally asserted their national interests against these courts.  
 
…We are an outward reaching country, not inwards [looking]. We still think we can 
learn from others, notwithstanding that there can be unforeseen consequences... 
Mutula Kilonzo, Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, explaining why  
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AFRICAN STATES HAVE TO A GREATER EXTENT than other world regions formally 
judicialised their political affairs.1 When the Cold War ended, sub-Saharan Africa had only one 
permanent international court (IC): the inoperative Court of Justice of the Economic Community of 
Central African States. By 2004 it had nine ICs, more than any other continent.2 By comparison, 
Europe has six, Latin America five, and Asia one. At the same time, African states make up the 
largest regional bloc in the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and 
were among the first states to ratify the ICC treaty. Temporary international war crimes tribunals, 
such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Special Court for Sierra Leone, have 
also emerged after conflicts. 
  International relations theorists have struggled to account for this African enthusiasm for ICs. 
Karen Alter, whose recent account is the most systematic, admits to having ‘no good explanation’ 
for it.3 Cesare Romano’s recent survey of the topic also fails to account for African states’ 
practices.4 This article, by contrast, proposes an answer. Rejecting the two most prominent theories 
of international judicialisation - liberal institutionalism and constructivism - it argues that Africa’s 
many international courts should be understood as an example of legal ‘extraversion.’5 It was part 
of African states’ broader response to the particular international pressures and financial constraints 
of the post-Cold War period. This argument is based on the in-depth analysis of two case studies: 
Zimbabwe’s support for establishing the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Tribunal and Kenya’s support for creating the ICC. 
                                                          
1 We refer here narrowly to ‘constitutive judicialisation’: the creation, not use, of new courts. Lars Blichner and Anders 
Molander, ‘Mapping Juridification’, European Law Journal 14, 1 (2008), p. 41. 
2 These now included the Court of Justice of the African Economic Community (1991), the Court of Justice of the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (1996), Common Court of Justice and Arbitration of L'Organisation pour 
l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (1997), Court of Justice of the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (1998), Court of Justice of La Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Central (2000), the 
Southern African Development Community Tribunal (2000), East African Community Court of Justice (2001), Court of 
Justice of the Economic Community Of West African States (2001), and African Court on Human and People’s 
Rights (2004). See Cesare Romano, Karen Alter and Yuval Shany (eds), The Oxford University Press handbook of 
international adjudication (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014). 
3 Karen Alter, The new terrain of international law: Courts, politics, rights (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 
2014), p. 153. 
4 Cesare Romano, ‘The shadow zones of international judicialization’ in Romano, Alter and Shany (eds), The Oxford 
University Press handbook, pp. 98-9.  
5 Jean-François Bayart, ‘Africa in the world: A history of extraversion’, African Affairs 99, 395 (2000), pp. 217-67; The 
State in Africa: The politics of the belly (Polity, Cambridge, 2009). 
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  Our two case studies were selected for being representative and ‘crucial.’6 They relate to a regional 
and a global IC, which together represent the landscape of African judicialisation: most African ICs 
are regional in nature, while most African states have joined at least two global ICs. The country 
selection stems from Zimbabwe and Kenya’s recent roles in initiating political backlashes against 
the ICs: Zimbabwe co-ordinated a successful roll back of the SADC Tribunal’s human rights 
jurisdiction, while Kenya orchestrated a vocal African critique of the ICC. These developments 
make Zimbabwe and Kenya the most likely cases for a successful test of the mainstream 
explanations for international judicialisation. Liberal institutionalism stresses the importance of 
domestic politics; since the recent political backlashes signify the salience of domestic concerns, we 
should expect to see their influence on court design. Constructivism emphasises norm 
internalisation and civil society persuasion; given the assertive NGO sector in these two countries, 
we should expect to find its mobilisation helping explain court ratification. If these two most 
prevalent theories of court creation have their expectations disappointed in Kenya and Zimbabwe, 
then they are unlikely to explain other African cases. 
  Data for the case studies derive from interviews, parliamentary and UN research, and the relevant 
‘grey’ literature. Interviews were conducted in Nairobi in April and May 2011, and in Windhoek, 
Johannesburg and Harare in August and September 2011 and April 2012. Where relevant, regional 
data is included to show how our cases exemplify broader trends.  
  The article begins by mapping the proliferation of African international courts. Thereafter it 
examines mainstream international relations explanations for the creation of international legal 
regimes, relating them to important assumptions made by the specialist literature on Africa’s ICs. It 
then introduces and clarifies our understanding of the ‘extraversion’ concept, situating it within 
recent debates about African agency in international relations. This clarified concept is then used, 
finally, to analyse our two cases. 
 
The proliferation of African international courts 
 
Africa now has the most regional ICs, and all but two African states are part of a regional judicial 
system. Furthermore, with the exception of Europe, the world’s four global ICs cover more of 
                                                          
6 John Gerring, Case study research: Principles and practices (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007), pp. 91-
2 and 120-1. 
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Africa than they do of other regions: the International Court of Justice includes all African states, 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 83 percent, the World Trade Organisation 
Appellate Body 80 percent, and the ICC 63 percent. 
  This shift is part of a global turn to law: of the world’s 26 permanent, operational international 
courts, 19 were established after 1989.7 Africa’s international courts also reflect the global post-
Cold War trend of granting access to non-state actors and making jurisdiction compulsory.8 Seven 
of the 16 permanent international courts with private litigant initiation rights are located in Africa.9 
These new design features ‘[undermine] a government’s ability to block inconvenient legal suits 
from proceeding,’ and thus represent the possibility of judicial independence from politics.10 Table 
1 below summarises Africa’s international judicialisation. 
 
                                                          
7 Alter, The new terrain, pp. 73-5. 
8 See Ibid., pp. 81-5; Alexandra Harrington ‘Don’t mind the gap: The rise of individual complaint mechanisms within 
international human rights treaties,’ Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 22, 153 (2012), pp. 153-82.  
9 Alter, The new terrain, p. 84. 
10 Ibid., p. 83. 
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Table 1. Africa’s international judicialisation 
  Date of 
establishment 
(operational date) 
Issue area Individual access Compulsory 
jurisdiction 
Regional ICs 
1 Court of Justice of the 
Economic Community of 
West African States  
1993 (2001) Economic; human rights Yes Yes 
2 International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda 
1994 (1994) Atrocity  No, but independent 
prosecutor 
Yes 
3 Court of Justice of the West 
African Economic and 
Monetary Union 
1994 (1996) Economic No Yes 
4 Court of Justice of the 
Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa 
1994 (1998) Economic Yes, via national courts Yes  
5 Common Court of Justice and 
Arbitration of L'Organisation 
pour l'Harmonisation en 
Afrique du Droit des Affaires 
1995 (1997) Economic; business law Yes Yes 
6 African Court on Human and 
People’s Rights 
1998 (2006) Human rights Yes, with optional 
protocol 
Yes, with optional 
protocol  
7 Court of Justice of La 
Communauté Economique et 
1999 (2000) Economic Yes, via national courts Yes 
6 
Monétaire de l'Afrique 
Central 
8 East African Community 
Court of Justice 
1999 (2001) Economic; good 
governance 
Yes, via national courts Yes 
9 The Southern African 
Development Community 
Tribunal 
2000 (2007) Economic Yes, after exhausting 
domestic remedies 
Yes 
10 Special Court for Sierra 
Leone 





1 International Court of Justice 1945 (1946) Inter-state relations No No 
2 International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea  
1982 (1994) Maritime relations No No 
3 World Trade Organization 
Appellate Body  
1994 (1995) Trade No Yes 
4 International Criminal Court  1998 (2002) Atrocity  No, but independent 
prosecutor 
Yes 
Sources: African International Courts and Tribunals, http://www.aict-ctia.org/ (3 May 2016); James T. Gathii, ‘The under-appreciated 
jurisprudence of African regional trade judiciaries’, Oregon Review of International Law 12 (2010), pp. 245-82;  Cesare Romano, Karen 
Alter and Yuval Shany (eds), The Oxford handbook of international adjudication (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015).
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Mainstream explanations: state interests and tactical concessions 
 
Over the last 20 years, international relations research on legal regimes has been characterised by 
the emergence, and, more recently, convergence, of two significant research agendas: liberal 
institutionalist and constructivist. Each shares important assumptions with a particular strand of the 
specialist literature on African ICs. Liberal institutionalism begins from the assumption that states 
are rational utility-maximising entities. Such states seek to ensure a correspondence between their 
legal commitments and their national interests. This generates a puzzle: why would states create 
international courts, given the corresponding loss of control and sovereignty? Institutionalists argue 
that legal institutions offer a number of desirable functions: they reduce transaction costs, expand 
the grounds for compromise, monitor compliance, and adjudicate disputes. International 
judicialisation thus occurs ‘when the benefits of reducing future political uncertainty outweigh the 
“sovereignty costs” of membership.’11  
  These institutionalist assumptions of shared interests are prevalent in scholarship about Africa’s 
international judicialisation. For instance, Charles Jalloh argues that support for the creation of the 
ICC derived from ‘self-interest and historical experiences with untold atrocities’, while James 
Gathii derives regional trade agreements from ‘cross-border challenges’ and ‘co-operation around 
common resources.’12 
  In liberal institutionalist theory, design features reflect state preferences when establishing ICs. 
Features such as compulsory jurisdiction and private access enable courts to enforce law and 
regulate bureaucracies and governments; this makes them ‘self-binding’ from the perspective of 
state parties.13 Self-binding international commitments ‘lock in’ domestic policies in the face of 
                                                          
11 Andrew Moravscsik, ‘The origins of human rights regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe’, International 
Organization 54, 2 (2000), p. 220. 
12 Charles C. Jalloh ‘Regionalizing International Criminal Law?’, International Criminal Law Review 8 (2008), p. 497; 
James T. Gathii, African regional trade agreements as legal regimes (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011), 
p. xxix. 
13 Karen J. Alter, ‘Delegating to International Courts: Self-binding vs. Other-binding Delegation’, Law and 
Contemporary Problems 71, 1 (2008), pp. 37-76. 
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future political uncertainty.14 They are motivated by a distrust of future governments15 or a need to 
signal credibility to domestic audiences.16 Delegation to ICs thus has domestic sources.  
  A second research agenda is constructivist. Like institutionalism, this analyses the creation of new 
legal regimes in distinct stages, advancing different explanations for their design and states’ 
subsequent ‘commitment’ to (or ratification of) them.17 However, design choices do not reflect 
domestic political considerations. Instead, ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in civil society create new issue 
areas and then persuade (liberal) states and international organisations to institutionalise them. In 
the commitment phase, meanwhile, (authoritarian) states, who initially deny the validity of 
international norms, ratify treaties and accede to new institutions in order to make ‘tactical 
concessions.’ Under civil society pressure, that is, they make ‘cosmetic’ changes for ‘instrumental 
or strategic’ reasons, hoping to avoid ‘international isolation.’18 
  Constructivist scholarship on Africa’s international judicialisation focuses, similarly, on norm 
internalisation and the role of NGOs. For instance, Grant and Hamilton see in the many ICC Statute 
ratifications ‘a joint commitment to the norms associated with liberal conceptions of justice’, while 
Rachel Murray highlights NGOS’ role in persuading states to ratify the Protocol establishing the 
African Court on Human and People’s Rights.19 
  Both the case studies below demonstrate how these two mainstream theories fail to explain the 
African creation of international courts. African judicialisation becomes understandable, rather, 
when seen through the lens of Jean-François Bayart’s extraversion. 
 
                                                          
14 Moravscsik, ‘The origins’, p. 228. 
15 Ibid; Alter, The new terrain, p. 154. 
16 Beth Simmons and Allison Danner, ‘Credible commitments and the International Criminal Court’, International 
Organization 64, 2 (2010), pp. 225-56. 
17 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: 
Introduction’, in Thomas Risse, Kathryn Sikkink and Stephen Ropp (eds), The power of human rights: International 
norms and domestic change (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999), pp. 1-38; Thomas Risse and Stephen 
Ropp, ‘Introduction and overview’, in Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The persistent power of 
human rights: From commitment to compliance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013), pp. 3-25. 
18 Risse and Sikkink, ‘The socialization’, pp. 25-28; Risse and Ropp, ‘Introduction and overview’, pp. 6-7. 
19 J. Andrew Grant and Spencer Hamilton, ‘Norm dynamics and international organisations: South Africa in the African 
Union and International Criminal Court’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 54, 2 (2016), p. 171; Rachel 
Murray, Human rights in Africa: from the OAU to the African Union (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004), 




The concept of extraversion denotes state elites’ pursuit and maintenance of relations of dependence 
with more powerful external actors in order to secure international support. It takes several forms, 
from manipulation of patron state alliances and alignment with donor policies to discursive and 
symbolic performances that shape the external representation.20 Practices of extraversion derive 
primarily from a longue durée history of African statehood, whereby difficulties in acquiring 
domestic rents and resources have turned regimes outwards, towards the international arena.21 Over 
time, they have actively pursued dependence on the international system, their external environment 
constituting less of a structural constraint than ‘a major resource in the process of political 
centralization and economic accumulation.’22 Dependency, on Bayart’s view, can thus represent a 
‘mode of action.’23 
  This idea illuminates our case studies in a variety of ways. An orientation towards accumulating 
resources from the international realm helps us understand why African ruling elites seemingly 
failed to pursue their national interests during the design of international courts; why they pre-
empted pressure from transnational networks for normative change; why their commitments to new 
institutions were signalled not to domestic populations; and, lastly, why there was nothing 
sovereignty-preserving about their concessions. In short, it helps us solve a puzzle that confounds 
scholars of international courts: the question of why Africa, to a greater extent than other regions, 
has made so many commitments to the international legal order that are apparently only ‘skin-
deep.’24 
                                                          
20 Bayart, ‘Africa in the world’; Jonathan Fisher, ‘‘Image management’ and African agency: Ugandan regional 
diplomacy and donor relations under Museveni’ in William Brown and Sophie Harman (eds), African agency in 
international politics (Routledge, Abingdon, 2013), pp. 97-113; Cédric Jourde, ‘The international relations of small 
neoauthoritarian states: Islamism, warlordism and the framing of stability’, International Studies Quarterly 51, 2 
(2007), pp. 481-503; Caryn Peiffer and Pierre Englebert, ‘Extraversion, Vulnerability to Donors, and Political 
Liberalization in Africa’, African Affairs 111, 444 (2012), pp. 355-78. 
21 Bayart, The state in Africa, p. lvi. 
22 Bayart, ‘Africa in the world’, p. 219. 
23 Ibid., p. 218. 
24 Romano, ‘The shadow zones’, p. 99. This point can be illustrated with the example of the ECOWAS Community 
Court. Although by far the most active of Africa’s regional courts, it still confronts ‘Herculean challenges’ in attempting 
to enforce judgements, a majority of which remain dead letter. Jerry Ukaigwe, ECOWAS Law (Springer, Cham, 2016), 
10 
  Methodologically, the notion of extraversion highlights African agency in the international system. 
Where the interest-oriented and self-binding agency assumed by liberal institutionalists is difficult 
to find empirically in Africa’s international relations, as we shall see below, constructivists struggle 
to theorise agency by internationally weak, non-liberal states and limit their role to the making of 
(doomed) tactical concessions.25 More generally, realists focus on ‘how external actors such as aid 
donors and great powers old and new have affected a marginalised, victimised and almost 
politically inert “Africa”.’26 
  Bayart’s work challenges such assumptions. Identifying explanatory mechanisms – ‘framing’ and 
‘image management’ – Cédric Jourde and Jonathan Fisher show how some African elites have 
succeeded in actively influencing how donors and hegemons see them, in line with ‘positive’ 
narratives of international assistance.27 In this way, even dominant external actors can become 
‘sucked into’ African struggles over external resources used to pursue internal political agendas.28 
This is a process that alters both the dominant and the weak party; to maintain resource flows 
extraverted states actively engage in ‘discursive and symbolic performances’ that ‘shape’ the 
representations that stronger counterparts hold about them.29 The notion of extraversion thus build 
on the Foucauldian insight that resistance resides at ‘the very heart of the power relationship … 
constantly provoking it.’30 Ignoring the strategies of ‘dominated’ African regimes, in short, leads us 
to fatally misunderstand their international relations. 
  Extraversion should not, however, be understood as a permanent feature of African politics. Bayart 
has been criticised, notably, for ahistoricism, treating the deep ‘grammar’ of extraversion as an all-
                                                                                                                                                                                                
p. 99. Illustrating member states’ lack of commitment to the court, even its Registry officials are uncertain of how many 
states have designated organs to oversee implementation - estimates range between three and five of the 15 member 
countries (interview with Registry officials, Abuja, 1 August 2016). 
25 Risse, Sikkink and Ropp (eds), The power of human rights; ‘The socialization’; Risse and Ropp, ‘Introduction and 
overview’, p. 15. 
26 William Brown, ‘A question of agency: Africa in international politics’, Third World Quarterly 33, 10, p. 1890. 
27 Fisher, ‘‘Image management’; Jourde, ‘The international relations’. 
28 Christopher Clapham, Africa in the international system: The politics of state survival (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1996), p. 139. 
29 Jourde, ‘The international relations’, pp. 484-5.  
30 Michel Foucault, ‘The subject and power’, in James Faubion (ed.), The essential works of Foucault 1954–1984: 
Volume III, power (New Press, New York, 2000), p. 342. 
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pervasive and unchanging aspect of Africa’s ‘historicity.’31 Any such a view obscures historical 
shifts, such as that associated with the end of the Cold War. Legal extraversion was but one possible 
strategic response to the many constraints imposed by Africa’s international environment; just one 
of many Bayartian techniques of self-preservation adopted by African ruling regimes after 1989. 
  This dynamic notion of extraversion illuminates, notably, the variable salience of African 
nationalism in international relations. As recent backlash against the ICC has helped make clear, 
this ideology was not simply exhausted by the 1990s, as Karen Alter claims.32 But nor, pace 
William Brown, have nationalist norms been so fundamentally constitutive of African states that 
they have always been unwilling to relinquish formal legal sovereignty for the sake of aid.33 
Nationalist discourse was deliberately de-emphasised to serve extraversion in the 1990s. As 
Celestine Nyamu-Musembi has described, the post-1989 rule of law revival was, ‘on the whole,’ 
donor-driven, with international support for justice sector programmes rising six-fold between 1994 
and 2002.34 For many weak states, this placed a premium on international legitimation as a rule-of-
law respecting state, leading them to pre-empt such donor pressures. The creation of international 
courts thus allowed African states to redefine their international identities.  
  By contrast, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, African states produced one of the world’s most 
idiosyncratic human rights documents: the 1981 African Charter of Human and People’s Rights. 
The Charter’s particularities - which included the ‘right to development’, ‘peoples rights’ and even 
duties towards the ‘national community’ and family - were intended to signal a ‘revanchist’ African 
dissatisfaction with the post-war international order.35 Sovereignty had been carefully protected and 
global scripts ignored. The contrast between such self-assertive stances and those of the next decade 
could hardly be starker. 
                                                          
31 E.g. Thomas Young, ‘The state and politics in Africa’, Journal of Southern African Studies 25, 1 (1999), p. 151. 
Bayart, meanwhile, protests that he only seeks to analyse a historically contingent form of ‘governmentality’: a 
‘complex strategic situation in a given society’. Bayart, ‘Fait missionnaire et politique du ventre: une lecture 
foucaldienne’, Le Fait Missionnaire 6 (1998) pp. 14-5. 
32 Alter, The new terrain, p. 136-7. 
33 William Brown, ‘Sovereignty matters: Africa, donors, and the aid relationship’, African Affairs 112, 447 (2013), pp. 
270, 281. 
34 Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, ’Ruling out gender equality? The post-Cold War rule of law agenda in sub-Saharan 
Africa’ in Third World Quarterly 27, 7 (2006), p. 1194. 
35 Nathaniel Rubner, The origins of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (University of Cambridge, 




Judicialisation as extraversion: the ICC and the SADC Tribunal  
 
The following case studies examine how the ruling elites in Kenya and Zimbabwe supported the 
creation of the ICC and the SADC Tribunal. They focus on the design of, and initial commitment 
to, these two international courts, as this is where the explanatory power of the two mainstream 
theories purports to lie. The studies analyse court initiation, rule negotiation, design features, and 
treaty ratification, arguing that the creation of these courts was less the result of liberal state agency 
or civil society pressure and more the outcome of a set of extraverted practices.   
 
 
Kenyan support for the ICC 
 
Almost two-thirds of African states have joined the ICC. 21 did so during the first four years after 
the Rome Conference that established the ICC. The early African support for the establishment of 
the ICC is well-documented, yet poorly explained.36 This case study analyses support by the Moi 





Inter-state negotiations of the ICC treaty took place in four forums: the 1995 Ad Hoc Committee on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court provided for the first informal negotiations on 
a draft ICC statute prepared by the International Law Commission. Negotiations continued in the 
Preparatory Committee, which met at the UN in New York between 1996 and 1998.37 This work 
                                                          
36 Charles C. Jalloh, ‘Regionalizing’; Max du Plessis, ‘The International Criminal Court that Africa wants’ (Institute for 
Security Studies, Pretoria, 2010). 
37 No summary records of the Ad Hoc and Preparatory Committee meetings exist, but see Christopher Keith Hall ‘The 
first two sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’, The 
American Journal of International Law 91, 1 (1997), pp. 177-87, and ‘The third and fourth sessions of the UN 
13 
culminated in the 1998 Rome Conference, where 120 states formally adopted the ICC Statute. 
Afterwards a Preparatory Commission tackled outstanding issues. Through advocacy for technical 
assistance and financial support, African states, including Kenya, inserted themselves in this 
drafting process as dependent participants. 
  The work of the Ad Hoc and Preparatory Committees was marked by ‘limited participation’ of 
delegations from developing countries.38 Du Plessis argues that African states ‘contributed 
extensively to the preparations leading up to, during and after’ the Rome Conference,39 but 
observers in Preparatory Committee noted that African countries participated actively only in the 
final session.40 According to African members, the obstacle was financial.  
  African states addressed the ‘continuing absence of a large number of delegations, particularly 
from developing countries’ and advocated the establishment of trust funds to finance the 
participation of the least developed countries in the design process.41 The first fund was set up in 
late 1996, but 1997 saw little participation from developing countries and hence little design input 
by these states.42 According to South Africa, more developing states would have participated if the 
fund had provided for delegates’ cost of living expenses during meetings.43 
  African states met regionally to explore common positions on the ICC. SADC countries developed 
a Common Statement of support for an independent ICC, while 25 African states met in Dakar.44 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’, The American Journal of 
International Law, 92, 1 (1998), pp. 124-33. 
38 Hall, ‘The first two sessions’, p. 186. 
39 Max du Plessis, ‘The International Criminal Court’, p. 6.  
40 Christopher Keith Hall ‘The sixth session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court’, The American Journal of International Law 92, 2 (1997), p. 556. 
41 Statement by Kenya, UN Doc. A/C.6/51/SR.27 (29 October 1996). See statements from Cote D’Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda in UN Docs 
A/C.6/51/SR.27 (29 October 1996), A/C.6/51/SR.29 (1 November 1996), A/C.6/52/SR.11 (21 October 1997), 
A/C.6/52/SR.12 (23 October 1997), A/C.6/52/SR.13 (23 October 1997), A/C.6/53/SR.9 (21 October 1998), 
A/C.6/53/SR.10 (21 October 1998), A/C.6/53/SR.11 (22 October 1998), A/C.6/53/SR.12 (22 October 1998), 
A/C.6/54/SR.14 (22 October 1999). 
42 UN Doc. A/Res/51/207 (17 December 1996). 
43 Statement by South Africa, UN Doc. A/C.6/52/SR.11 (21 October 1997). 
44 Sivu Maqungo, ‘The establishment of the International Criminal Court: SADC’s participation in the negotiations’, 
African Security Review 9, 1 (2000), n.p.; ‘Dakar declaration for the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
in 1998’. 
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These meetings aimed to create consistency in negotiating positions, but African countries joined 
different alliances in Rome.45 
  The Rome Conference took place in mid-1998, bringing 160 state delegations together with 30 
international bodies and 138 NGOs. At the Conference, state delegations split into informal 
groupings, such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the like-minded group. The conference was 
dominated by the like-minded states, a cluster of more than 60 delegations that were supportive of 
establishing the ICC and committed to particular design features that were incorporated into the 
Statute: jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the elimination of a 
Security Council veto on prosecutions, an independent prosecutor with proprio motu authority, and 
the prohibition of reservations to the Statute.46 
  Kenya preferred, along with most African states, the Non-Aligned caucus, advocating  minimising 
Security Council control over the ICC.47 Although the ICC’s proprio motu indictment of Kenyan 
government officials in 2010 imposed an accountability process, there is no indication that the Moi 
administration intended to ‘self-bind’ or ‘lock in’ future governments. In fact, it opposed 
prosecutorial proprio motu powers.48 Instead, Kenya ‘called upon the international community to 
assist developing countries in their efforts to strengthen … their justice administration systems, 
including the courts.’49  
  Delegates from 52 developing countries participated in the Rome Conference under the auspices 
of the trust fund. Using trust funds to facilitate participation in multilateral conferences was not 
                                                          
45 Only six SADC countries joined the like-minded group, although the group’s position corresponded to the SADC 
declaration. The ‘like-minded’ African states were Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Ghana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zambia. See William Schabas, The 
International Criminal Court: A commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), p. 22 n. 
170. 
46 William Schabas, An introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2001), pp. 15-16. Proprio motu authority permits the Prosecutor to initiate investigations, subject to Pre-Trial Chamber 
approval. 
47 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
‘Official records, volume II. Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the 
Whole.’ UN Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II) (United Nations, New York, 1998), pp. 77, 208. 
48 Ibid., pp. 199-200.  
49 Ibid., p. 77. 
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novel, but the practice was ‘new to conferences convened to codify public international law.’50 
Given that negotiations are relational, African countries’ continuous calls for monetary support may 
have weakened their bargaining positions. 
  Constructivist scholarship highlights the role of NGOs during the Rome Conference.51 However, 
the 134 participating NGOs were overwhelmingly based in Europe and North America; only 14 
were African.52 These include a Kenyan legal association, which, however, does not appear to have 
influenced Kenya’s design decisions. In contrast, western-based NGOs present at the New York and 
Rome sessions informed ‘like-minded’ positions.53 
  After the Conference, African states continued their extraverted discursive and symbolic 
performances: while urging the signing and ratification of the Rome Statute, they called for 
financial assistance to developing countries to participate in Commission meetings. Kenya even 
encouraged international NGOs to ‘extend their support’ so that ‘political, moral and social will 
could be mobilised.’54 Throughout the drafting process, African states thus constructed their 
participation as dependent on charity by wealthier states. This representation surely did not 
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Kenya, now ruled by Mwai Kibaki, ratified the Statute in March 2005, based on a ‘unanimous 
decision’ by the cabinet.55 As in many other African countries, the decision to commit to the ICC 
was purely an executive matter, which was not put to parliament.56 When asked in 2011 why Kenya 
ratified the Rome Statute, the then Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Mutula Kilonzo, 
explained, 
 
we are an outward reaching country, not inwards [looking]. We still think we can learn from others, 
notwithstanding that there can be unforeseen consequences, but we are a country that looks far beyond our 
borders.57 
 
Even a cabinet minister (and lawyer by profession) in charge of unprecedented judicial overhaul did 
not explain Kenya’s commitment to the ICC in terms of domestic factors.  
  Kenya became the 27th African ICC state party, because foot-dragging ‘aimed at buying time’ to 
‘put off pressure’ by the US to sign a bilateral agreement to not surrender Kenyan and US citizens 
to the ICC.58 The Kibaki regime resisted ‘being arm and neck twisted by the big brother’ into 
signing the agreement59 and therefore lost military aid and economic support worth USD 8.76 
million in 2005.60 The decision to delay ratification had tangible benefits, as Kenya avoided a US 
penalty in 2004. Liberal institutionalist theory may explain this delay, but cannot account for the 
decision to ratify, given the costs of doing so. 
  Civil society interest in Kenyan ratification emerged during 2004, but was confined to a few 
organisations. Only after the 2008 post-election crisis did MPs and civil society become interested 
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in the ICC.61 As predicted by constructivists, foreign NGOs got involved, but this was three years 
after ratification. 
  Kenyan support before, during and after the Rome Conference did not meet liberal institutionalist 
or constructivist expectations, but can be understood as extraverted agency. International 
deliberation centred on material assistance and ‘image management’, rather than on specific design 
features that matched national interests or spoke to civil society concerns. Participation and 
ratification were not communicated domestically, thus hardly providing a credible commitment or a 
tactical concession. Kenyan participation in the negotiations was discursively produced as relying 
on the UN trust funds,62 thus pulling like-minded states into the project as financial sponsors. 
Committed to the Statute’s rapid entry into force, like-minded states realized they ‘would need to 
allocate substantial resources to assist smaller states in the process’ of promoting universal 




Zimbabwean support for the SADC Tribunal 
 
The SADC Tribunal confounds institutionalist and constructivist expectations. Our analysis of the 
design phase largely takes SADC states as a group, whilst our analysis of ratification (when 
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SADC was founded in August 1992, during the post-apartheid transition. It replaced the Southern 
African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), established in 1980. This organisation’s 
main achievement had been to divert trade from areas affected by apartheid ‘de-stabilisation.’64 Its 
institutions were decentralised and sovereignty-preserving, with each member state responsible for 
co-ordinating development projects in a particular area. Disputes which could not be ‘settled by 
negotiation, conciliation or other means’ were to be ‘referred to the Summit’, comprised of Heads 
of State.65 No court was envisaged. These were idiosyncratic arrangements: the first systematic 
rejection of orthodox integration theory by any group of Third World nations.66 Yet during the Cold 
War donors did not endorse global scripts. They even praised SADCC. In 1988 World Bank Vice-
President for Africa, Edward Jaycox, labelled it a ‘functioning example of how regional cooperation 
in Africa might work’, whilst British Minister for Overseas Development, Chris Patten, declared 
that to ‘support SADCC is to support success.’67 
  After the Cold War and apartheid, however, senior SADCC figures immediately understood that 
new and more prescriptive donor agendas needed to be catered to. Foreign agencies had provided 
over 90 per cent of the organisation’s funding.68 Sweden was the leading donor and Nordic aid 
(overwhelmingly dedicated to anti-apartheid) had exceeded inflow of commercial capital.69 By 
1990 threats to this revenue were obvious.70 SADCC's Zimbabwean Executive Secretary, Simba 
Makoni, spoke candidly of why extraversion tactics might be required:  
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support from the international community has not really come to us on our own account. It has come to us as 
sympathy support against apartheid … So while one appreciates the amount that we have been receiving, the 
spirit behind the figures is not a very comforting one, because if it remains the basis for that support, when 
apartheid goes, the so will the funds go with it.71 
 
Radical ‘economic liberation’ rhetoric retreated along with Scandinavian aid.72 Tracking the 
changed preferences of its new principal donors, led by the European Economic Community, 
SADCC soon endorsed more orthodox forms of economic integration as cures for Africa’s 
economic woes.73 
  It was not immediately obvious, however, that any revamped organisation would include an 
equivalent of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In 1991, SADCC officials preferred an 
‘arbitration tribunal or a committee’, the two alternatives then being considered for the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).74 This position changed dramatically at SADCC’s 1992 
Consultative Conference. The Conference's Theme Document, partly drafted by European experts, 
proposed an ECJ-style institution which even ordinary citizens could approach: a mechanism of 
‘mediation and arbitration, to which all agents of integration – governments, business, civil 
associations and individuals – can seek justice.’75 The extraversion strategies behind this 
recommendation were alluded to in the Document itself. Whilst ‘international political and material 
support for SADCC’ had been ‘predicated on the anti-apartheid struggle’, future external assistance 
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would depend upon ‘policy reforms’.76 European donors stressed that aid would become conditional 
on ‘necessary political decisions’ and ‘renouncing part of … sovereignty.’77  
  Heads of State swiftly pre-empted conditionality, claiming to have ‘draw[n] important lessons’ 
from the European Economic Community’s Maastricht Summit.78 Six months later, the 1992 
Windhoek Treaty relaunched SADCC as SADC. A regional Tribunal would be among ‘the central 
intergovernmental organs’ of the new Community, despite there having been effectively no regional 
debate about whether such court promoted inter-regional trade.79 Even within South Africa's ANC, 
which was already universally recognised as the most powerful force in SADC, debate about the 
various options had ‘scarcely even begun’.80 Indeed, as Lenz notes, ‘when the decision was taken to 
establish a Tribunal with the Windhoek Treaty, no real discussion on the costs and benefits of 
different options had taken place at the regional level.’81 Strategic explanations for legal institutions 
clearly cannot explain this outcome. 
  The Zimbabwean Justice Minister has recently argued that post-1992 negotiations left the SADC 
Tribunal without the ‘DNA imprint’ of member states.82 The evidence largely supports his 
assertion. South Africa was the first and only state to develop a distinctive public position. In 
October 1993, the ANC called for a dedicated ‘Regional Court of Human Rights’ and even a 
‘Regional Mutual Security structure, to enforce and protect human rights.’83 Six months later, 
however, when the new post-apartheid government had finally officially joined SADC, the ANC’s 
desire to protect its new Constitutional Court caused it to become suspicious of all such 
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institutions.84 Three years later, meanwhile, during the first discussions over the Tribunal Protocol, 
SADC states rejected calls by two legal experts – including a judge from the ECJ – for ‘an 
embryonic form of human rights jurisdiction.’85 The final Protocol, signed in 2000, created an 
institution more like the ECJ itself than a human rights court. It established a court with private 
access rights, exclusive competence to constitutional review, and a preliminary rulings procedure 
lifted entirely from the European Union’s Treaty of Rome.86 Tribunal officials confirm that the 
Luxembourg Court remains the Tribunal’s primary point of reference.87 
  The creation of Tribunal with such powers is difficult to explain by referencing member state 
preferences. And yet, despite the presence of an ECJ legal expert, there is no evidence that it was 
the product of aid conditionality or direct EU pressures.88 Nor did it reflect the preferences of 
regional NGOs and norm entrepreneurs. Between 1994 and 1997, at the height of liberal post-
apartheid optimism, there had indeed been considerable mobilisation around the question of a court 
for SADC. Zimbabwean lawyers and human rights organisations were central to these networks, as 
they are today – with involvement from soon-to-be leading opposition politicians such as 
Welshman Ncube and David Coltart.89 In 1996, after 18 months of internal consultations and 
meetings with ministers and SADC officials, these NGOS produced a draft human rights charter for 
the region, which was to be applied by a dedicated Human Rights Court.90 As already noted, 
however member states rejected this option, preferring instead to emulate the ECJ.  
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  One inevitable consequence of these extraversion strategies was shoddy statecraft. The 1992 
Windhoek Treaty was notable for both its ‘poor drafting’ and eager repeating of the ‘global script’ 
of human rights.91 Despite states being opposed a dedicated human rights court, they nonetheless 
added 21 direct and indirect references to such rights to the new Community’s Protocols.92 Even 
before judges began interpreting these references in ‘activist’ ways, regional NGOs had noted how 
they allowed for human rights litigation.93 As argued by Judge Ariranga Pillay, once President of 
the court, regional leaders had simply failed to protect their interests when drafting the Treaty. They 
never ‘process[ed] all the implications of a SADC Tribunal.’ Their goal for the institution was 
simply ‘to get funds from the European Union and others’ by giving-off ‘all the right buzz words, 
you know, “democracy, rule of law, human rights”.’94 In a classic case of ‘image management’, 





Neither civil society mobilisation nor domestic political calculation account for ratification of the 
Tribunal. As described below, the process was lengthy and haphazard. This was perhaps 
unsurprising, however, given SADC states’ reluctance in the mid-1990s to actually implement the 
Windhoek reforms; post-apartheid extraversion having (temporarily) constrained donors’ once 
‘barely concealed eagerness’ to withdraw funding.96 Institutional reform only returned to the SADC 
agenda in 1999, thanks to the contingencies of high politics. Eager to intervene in the Democratic 
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Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe's President Mugabe had hoped to detach the SADC’s Organ on 
Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation from the rest of the organization.97 The Summit 
defused the tensions this created by reviewing the Organ's role, but only as an ‘integral part of the 
SADC.’98  
  This unplanned reopening of the SADC ‘reform debate’ amounted to a dramatic ‘volte face’, one 
only made possible by the ‘highly personalized’ nature of foreign policy making in the region.99 It 
allowed donors and reformers in the Secretariat a fresh opportunity to advocate centralised 
institutions.100 A number of bilateral donors, critical of SADC’s inefficiency, eventually started 
withdrawing aid.101 European Commission contributions now easily surpassed all others, including 
those of member states. It soon decided to continue its support, but resolved inter alia to ‘monitor 
the implementation of SADC protocols and [...] the Establishment of a SADC Tribunal.’102 It was in 
this context that the drafters of the new Tribunal Protocol (signed in 2000) began worrying ‘they 
might never get the nine ratifications needed to get the Protocol binding.’103 Only Botswana had 
complied.104 Without NGO pressures, these drafters produced an Amendment Treaty circumventing 
ratification. Although SADC Ministers agreed there was now ‘no further requirement for individual 
member states to ratify the Protocol’, Namibia, Mauritius and Lesotho somehow did so nonetheless; 
‘dutifully complying’ with a ‘redundant formality.’105 Ratifying SADC states, in short, neither 
responded to civil society pressures nor signalled ‘credible commitments’ to their populations. 
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  Zimbabwe’s (non-)ratification is perhaps even more striking in this respect. In 2008, famously, it 
was defeated in Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe; white farmers successfully using the Tribunal to 
challenge the expropriation of their land.106 EU donors consistently covered most Tribunal costs, 
with member states not even paying for necessary furniture.107 Both before and after Campbell, 
these donors also arranged visits for Tribunal judges to numerous international courts.108 Soon 
afterwards officials from leading liberal NGOs tried to persuade the Zimbabwean farmers to drop 
Campbell, convinced the Tribunal’s judges would inevitably adjudicate using international rule-of-
law standards. This, they believed, would be the end of the court.109  
  These efforts failed. ZANU-PF’s humiliating defeat in Campbell saw it successfully orchestrate 
backlash against the Tribunal. But it did so in ways revealing failures to adopt the ‘tactical’ 
approach towards ratification anticipated by the mainstream theories. Immediately after Campbell, 
Ambassador to Namibia, Chipo Zindoga, declared that ‘We cannot walk out from our own organ ... 
Zimbabwe, as a member of SADC, was instrumental in the formation of the Tribunal.’110 The next 
year, Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa claimed that Zimbabwe had in fact never been properly 
subject to its jurisdiction. He argued that the Tribunal Protocol drafters had illegally circumvented 
the need for ratifications.111 This was a confusing intervention: ZANU-PF had apparently now 
defended itself in a court which it believed illegally constituted. Indeed, it had even sent a judge, 
Antonina Guvava, to that same court.112 None of this suggested a ‘tactical’ approach to ratification, 
but was symptomatic of a wider regional lack of enthusiasm for the SADC Tribunal. The Tribunal 
was intended to signal rule-of-law commitments to international actors.  
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Over the last two decades, the largest and least investigated changes in the international judiciary 
have occurred in Africa. States have created a new international judicial infrastructure to enforce 
rules pertaining to a wide range of activities, from trade and investments to governance and 
conflict-related atrocity. The fact of Africa’s international judicialisation, however, has not been 
matched by an understanding of the factors that drove it. Commentators now regularly record their 
puzzlement with how African states have interacted with international law and courts.  
  Scholars note the signing of ‘bizarre’ bilateral investment treaties between countries with 
effectively no economic relations (such as Sudan and Zambia), and they concede, obliquely, that 
new theories may be needed for ‘some regions.’113 The perpetual under-funding and under-
utilization of regional courts is noted by almost everyone, begging the question of why these 
institutions were established.114 Whilst Tiyanjana Maluwa observes how AU treaties – unlike their 
UN equivalents – are often unratified, despite African states’ greater input into their drafting.115 
  The present analysis of ‘legal extraversion’ suggests a general method for explaining such 
empirical puzzles. Indeed, the politics of Africa’s international law is bewildering only insofar as 
analysis is informed by the assumptions of the mainstream paradigms. As this article demonstrates, 
in two cases with a most likely theoretical fit, these assumptions cannot be justified empirically. In 
neither the case of Kenya and the ICC nor of Zimbabwe and the SADC Tribunal was African 
support for the creation of an IC explained by external coercion or ‘tactical concessions’ to 
normative persuasion: African IC support during the design and ratification phases took place in the 
absence of donor conditionality, value entrepreneurism, and NGO pressure. Yet institutionalists 
would be wrong to conclude that ‘externally oriented explanations have attracted far more attention 
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than they deserve’116 and to assume instead that an interest-driven domestic political calculus must 
take priority: Kenya and Zimbabwe did not attempt to give the ICC and the SADC Tribunal a 
national imprint and they certainly did not aim to self-bind. The governments of Mugabe and 
Kibaki mobilised backlash against the two ICs when their activities were constrained for the first 
time. 
  African states’ support for IC creation can be understood as driven by deliberate strategies to 
manage their image and thereby obtain rents from the international arena. Thus, Africa became the 
new ‘frontier’117 for international law, and particularly international criminal law, as a result of 
efforts by state elites to forge new external relationships within the context of the post-Cold War 
rule-of-law revival. 
  Our argument is not without contemporary political implications. Although our explanation 
focuses on the rise, not demise, of ICs in Africa, it helps illuminate the current backlash on the 
continent.118 Today’s dramatic revolt against ICs by state elites represents neither a departure from 
a cost-benefit calculus or a rejection of previously internalised values. It is only explicable once one 
has fully grasped the strategic background behind African states’ numerous ‘skin-deep’ 
commitments to new international legal institutions in the 1990s and early 2000s. More than a 
newfound quest for impunity, contemporary de-judicialisation forms part of a long-term re-framing 
of African state identities in the international system. 
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